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Abstract 
This dissertation considers that the prohibition of anti-competitive unilateral conduct by 
dominant undertakings is not absolute, but allows for derogation. The ECJ has accepted 
and used the objective justification plea in order to legitimate prima facie abusive 
conducts that fulfill the demanded requirements. This thesis contains a detailed 
examination of the concept of ‘objective justification’, focusing in particular on its 
scope and the applicable legal conditions. An analysis also of the notions of abuse and 
dominance is included, because their precise definition is important for the better 
understanding of the term objective justification. This thesis submits that is very 
important to tackle with the formalistic approach and adopt the effect- based approach 
in the examination of Article 102 TFEU and of objective justifications. There is the 
need for a clear definition regarding the term objective justification, which will enhance 
the legal certainty. As far as the subdivision of the different types of objective 
justifications is concerned, this thesis accepts the following subdivision of objective 
justifications: companies with market power should be allowed to engage in (i) 
legitimate business behaviour (either as part of their commercial freedom or in case of 
objective necessity), (ii) efficient conduct with a positive welfare effect and (ii) conduct 
that promotes a relevant public interest. Finally, this thesis considers whether 
environmental protection factors must be approved as an objective justification under 
Article 102 TFEU and whether they play any role in European Competition Law in 
general, and whether they should play a role. 
 
Keywords: objective justification, abuse, dominant position, efficiency, environmental 
policy. 
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Article 102 TFEU because I wanted to deepen my knowledge in the effect-based 
analysis and the economic analysis applied in European Competition Law, which is also 
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approved by the ECJ. 
The main difficulty that I faced during my thesis was the fact that there is no 
specific definition of the term objective justification and my research based on case by 
case reasearch of the european jurisprudence. This was also the beauty of this research, 
because through studying the ECJ’s rulings, I had the chance to deepen my knowledge 
in the European Competition Law, to understand better the main objectives that the ECJ 
and the Commission have concerning Article 102 TFEU and present the main 
interpretative legal issues and the conflicts and even the inconsistencies in some rulings 
in my scientific work. 
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em. Athanassios Kaissis for the very good organization and the high quality of our 
master program. Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents for 
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years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This 
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Introduction 
Few legal rules are absolute. Practically all prohibitions allow for derogation 
under certain circumstances. The scope and meaning of such derogations or 
justifications will often determine whether or not a prohibition applies. The same also 
applies in competition law and arises the question whether in prima facie 
anticompetitive agreements there is the possibility of application of a justification. 
Similarly, a merger that appears to lessen competition at first sight may nonetheless be 
cleared because of its expected efficiencies. As a result justifications and efficiencies 
play an important role as far as the debates on the appropriate scope of competition law 
are concerned. All the above mentioned will be examined in the case of unilateral 
conduct by companies with market power. This thesis will examine how the term 
“objective justifications” appears and applies when a dominant firm has a dominant 
position. In such cases a company with a dominant position can only abuse its dominant 
position contrary to Art. 102 TFEU, if there is no objective justification. All the EU 
member states have adopted this terminology and recognized that it is possible to have a 
justification for unilateral anticompetitive conduct. 
Specifically, in the first chapter of this thesis is held a systematic analysis of the 
objectives of Article 102 TFEU, of the definitions of abuse and dominance along with 
the question what is and what should be the appropriate scope of the concept of 
objective justification within the framework of Article 102 TFEU, the utility of the 
examination of the objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU and the two-tier 
approach. The second Chapter of this thesis contains a detailed examination of the 
concept of “objective justification” focusing in particular on its scope of application and 
the legal conditions. This thesis’s aim is to prove that we must not follow a formalistic 
approach of Article 102 TFEU and that there is the need to examine thoroughly this 
concept of “objective justification” in order to improve legal certainty. The third chapter 
of this thesis handles with the question whether the protection of the environment can 
be entailed in the public interests that are approved as objective justifications and 
whether competition law should take into consideration environmental and social goals. 
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Article 102 TFEU: ABUSE, DOMINANT POSITION AND 
OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 
The objectives of Article 102 TFEU 
Article 102 TFEU deals with the unilateral conduct of undertakings which have 
a dominant position in the market and as a result substantial market power. Article 102 
prohibits one or more undertakings (collective dominance) which have a dominant 
position in the market or a substantial part of it to abuse their position and have a 
negative effect on trade between member states. The term undertaking has the same 
meaning as in Art.101 TFEU and the meaning of the effect is described in more detail 
by the Commission’s Guidelines and the decisions of the European Court of Justice. 
However, there is still a fundamental gap in our understanding of Article 102 
TFEU. It is widely accepted that an abuse under Article 102 TFEU will only exist only 
when there is no objective justification1. The ECJ and the Commission has not yet 
clarified the scope and the operation of the concept of objective justification of an abuse 
of dominant position and as a result there is a low level of legal certainty and 
predictability concerning this legal term. In addition, from a close examination of the 
case law concerning objective justifications the Court’s perception of this legal term 
seems to be very narrow  and to be related to objective factors and to public policy  that 
are beyond the control of the undertaking. 
The most difficult part to interpret concerning article 102 TFEU is the term of 
dominant position and of abuse which must be clearly defined and discerned. The 
holding of a dominant position itself it’s not something that is definitely prohibited and 
anti-competitive. Article 102 TFEU is infringed only when we have an abuse of the 
dominant position. Many times the two terms have been confused and even the ECJ on 
the impulse of the formalistic approach that the ordo-liberalism European competition 
law school adopts led to false conclusions and results. The way which the Commission 
and the EU Courts have interpreted Art. 102 TFEU has been extremely controversial. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Case C‐457/10 P, AstraZeneca v. Commission [2012] ECR I-0000, para. 130; 
Case C‐260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para 37; Case 311/84 CBEM v. CLT and IPB 
(‘Telemarketing’) [1985] ECR 3261, para. 26. See, further, the Opinion of AG Polares 
Maduro in Case C-109/03 KPN v. OPTA [2004] ECR I-11273, para. 53‐54; and the 
Opinion of AG Cosmas in Case C-344/98 Masterfoods v. HB Ice Cream [2000] ECR I-
11369, para. 101. 
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The adoption of a very strict formalistic approach in the application of Art.102 TFEU 
focused only on the form of the conduct and the drawing presumptions from that rather 
than to analyse the actual effects on the market. We came to the paradox result in many 
cases to protect the competitors (and not always the most competent ones) and not the 
competition itself and as a result the consumers. 
The EU Commission put the consumers’ welfare as the first priority of the free 
competitive internal market and tried to change this approach by promoting a new more 
effect-based approach which also takes into consideration the economic analysis of the 
law. In 2003 the EU Commission introduced a review of the application of Art.102 
TFEU on exclusionary abuses with the intention to modernize the application of Art. 
102 TFEU having as the main objective the consumers’ welfare. The review resulted in 
a DG Comp Staff Discussion Paper in 2005 and culminated in the Official Publication 
in February 2009 of Commission Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying 
Art.102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary contact (The Guidance Paper)2.This Guidance 
Paper sets out all the principles which will guide the Commission in deciding when to 
intervene and aims to enhance predictability and legal certainty in the application of 
Art.102TFEU. 
 
  
The definition of the terms: “Dominant Position” and Abuse 
This above mentioned change to a more effect-based approach shows the 
necessity to firstly clearly define and distinct the terms dominant position and abuse 
before starting to analyse and understand the scope and application of objective 
justifications under Art. 102 TFEU. In addition, for the interpretation of Art.102 TFEU 
we must also take into consideration the relationship of the Art.102 TFEU with the 
Article 101TFEU.  
The notion of dominant position under Art. 102 TFEU according to the ECJ case 
law is established on the market power that an undertaking has in the relative market. 
According to the case law, an undertaking has a dominant position in the market, if it 
has the economic strength to hinder effective competition and to behave independently 
                                                 
2 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 24.2.2009. 
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of its competitors, customers and consumers3. As a counterbalance to this substantial 
market power, the dominant firm has the ‘special responsibility’ according to ECJ’s 
rulings “not to impair the undistorted competition”4. The rationale that lies behind this 
special responsibility is that competition is already weakened by the presence in the 
market of a dominant firm and as a result if competition is further distorted the conduct 
leads to the infringement of Art. 102 TFEU and the consumer’s welfare cannot be 
achieved5. This rationale behind ECJ’s rulings has led and can also in the future lead to 
very restrictive and distortive results concerning the dominant undertaking. For 
example, it may prevent a dominant undertaking from providing a discount that “tends 
to remove or restrict a customer’s freedom to choose its sources of supply6. In this case, 
it is disputable if we want a competition policy that aims to protect competitors7 (even 
the inefficient ones who don’t show innovative and qualitative skills) from the 
expansive power of the dominant undertaking or the competition itself by allowing the 
dominant firm to expand, the market to regulate itself and to enhance consumers’ 
welfare8. 
In order to define dominant position under Art. 102 TFEU we must follow two 
stages of examination. Firstly, we must define the relevant market in which we will put 
the question whether the market power that has a firm makes it dominant by using the 
SNNIP test and the “hypothetical monopolist” approach. Secondly, we must define 
                                                 
3 Case C-322/81 Michelin v. Commission (‘Michelin I’) [1983] ECR 3461. See also 
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 38.  Case T- 
219/99 British Airways plc v Commission [2003] ECR II- 5917, [2004] 4 CMLR 1008. 
4 Michelin I, loc. cit, para 7. Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin 
NV v. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461, para.57.  
5 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, para 182. 
6 Michelin C-322/81, loc. cit, para 73. Similarly, Case 77/77 BP v. Commission [1978] 
ECR 1513, para 32. 
7 Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, “Article 82 EC: Where are we coming from and where are we 
going to?”, The Competition Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, March 2006, pp.9-11. 
8 See criticism to ordoliberalism and the debate on “Protection of competitors or 
protection of competition?”: Kallaugher and Sher ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti- 
Competition Effects and Exclusionary Abuse Under Article 82’ (2004) 25 ECLR 263; 
Venit ‘Article 82: The Last Frontier– Fighting Fire with Fire’ (2005) 28 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1157; Ahlborn and Padilla ‘From Fairness to Welfare: 
Implications for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in 
European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC 
(Hart Publishing, 2008, eds Ehlermann and Marquis); Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (The 
Free Press, 1993). 
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what dominant position is by not only referring to the market share9. We must take into 
consideration all the factors that may be concerned with market power and may function 
as indicators of market power.  For this reason, there are three criteria set out in para 12 
of the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings (‘Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities’) which are relevant to 
any assessment of market power. Summarizing Para 1210, we must take into 
consideration any constraints imposed by the actual competitors, by the potential 
competitors and by the bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers. These 
criteria prove that market shares figures can not provide information concerning the 
influence of the potential competitors who are not already in the market and the 
bargaining strength of the consumers. As a result, the market shares figures can only 
function as only one indicator for the market power. 
As far as the term of abuse is concerned, it must become clear that only the 
procession of a dominant position by an undertaking is not itself an offense but the 
abuse of this position infringes the Art.102 TFEU. The difficulty is that Art. 102 does 
not give a definition of the notion of abuse but only some examples of conducts that 
constitute an abuse and they are not an exhaustive list. The ECJ’s rulings on the term 
abuse are guided by the definition of abuse given in the Case Hoffmann La Roche11. By 
reading this definition for the notion of abuse in Hoffmann La Roche it becomes clear 
that the Court connected the notion of abuse with the impact that a conduct have upon 
the market structure by hindering the degree of the existing competition  or the growth 
of that competition12. For the first time in this case the notion of abuse is structured 
around the concept of “normal competition” which later is referred in the case law as 
“competition on the merits”13. 
From the Hoffman La Roche definition of abuse results that the Court stresses as 
a fundamental part or Art 102 TFEU the special obligation that a company has “not to 
                                                 
9 Richard Whish and David Bailey, “Competition Law”, Oxford University Press, 
Seventh Edition, 2012, pp. 179-181. 
10 Ibid, pp.42-45. 
11 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European 
Communities (1979), ECR 461, para. 91. 
12 Ibid, para 91. 
13 Case 62/86 Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para 70; Case T-
228/97 Irish Sugar v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, para 111; Case T-203/01 
Michelin v. Commission, para 97. 
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allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition”14 and secondly the court 
looks at the potential rather than the actual effect of the conduct on the structure of the 
market. Third, the notion of abuse is an objective concept. This means that the concepts 
of abuse and dominance are independent requirements of Art. 102 TFEU and they do 
not depend on the subjective intentions of the dominant undertaking to weaken 
competition or to affect their competitors. As a result, the definition of the abuse in the 
Hoffmann La Roche can not be assumed as an all-encompassing definition of what 
means abuse. It introduces the notion of completion on the merits and the normal 
competition, the special responsibility of the dominant firm and the objective character 
of the abuse but does not give a specific answer how all these abstract notions are 
interpreted and connected together. This lead the court to examine and decide every 
cease on its merits and not always following the same strict line on its rulings15. This 
also stresses the necessity to give a precise definition of the scope and the meaning of 
the objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU because they act as a 
counterbalance to the expanding interpretation of the term abuse. As more clearly 
defined and precise is the term objective justification the more restricted will be the 
term abuse and the less aggressive the enforcement policy under the Article 102 
TFEU16. 
It is very important, in order to understand what type of behavior constitutes an 
abuse, to discern between the exploitative and exclusionary abuses. Article 102 does not 
define these two categories of abuses and only in case law we can see interpretative 
approaches of them. An exploitative abuse is where the dominant undertaking obtains a 
benefit by placing an unfair burden on its customers and consumers, which is only 
possible because there is no alternative undertakings to which they can turn for 
supply17. On the other hand, exclusionary abuses restrict competition by the foreclosure 
                                                 
14 Paul-John Loewenthal, 'The Defence of “Objective Justification” in the Application 
of Article 82 EC', World Competition, Volume 28, Issue 4, (2005), Kluwer Law 
International, p. 455. 
15 Richard Wish, loc. cit, pp.197-198. 
16 Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective justification and Prima Facie 
anti-competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU Law and beyond”, PhD 
Thesis, Europa Institute, Faculty of Law, Leiden University,2014, p.52 and 111, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1887/29593 (accessed 11 November 2015). 
17 Paul-John Loewenthal , op. cit , p.457. 
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of the competitors and by altering the structure and the dynamics of the market18. The 
understanding of this distinction is very important for the understanding of the notion of 
abuse under Art. 102 TFEU. In addition, the rationale to examine both types of abuses 
under Art. 102 TFEU lays on the absence of the requirement that there is an “object or 
effect” of distorting competition in the provision unlike Art. 101 TFEU. This would 
exclude the exploitative abuses from the application of 102 TFEU since they do not 
have as their object or effect the distortion of competition. Although most of the cases 
considered under Art.102 TFEU were dealt with exclusionary abuses, the drafters of the 
Treaty wanted also exploitative abuses to be prohibited and as a result the provision 102 
TFEU will apply equally to exploitative abuses19. 
 
 
The use of ‘objective justification’ within Article 102 TFEU and the two-tier 
approach 
From the Hoffman La Roche Definition stand out two elements. A conduct is 
characterized as an abuse: 1) when it hinders the maintenance or growth of competition 
in the relevant market and 2) when it comes as a result of methods different than 
“normal competition” in products and services20. This is the famous two- tier approach 
in European Competition Law introduced by the Professor Ulmar, who applied a two-
step approach in order to identify conducts that hinder competition and constitute an 
abuse under Art.102 TFEU. According to this theory we have an abuse when the 
conduct affects significantly the opportunities of the competitors in the market and 
when this conduct is anticompetitive and not competition on the merits21. A similar 
approach we also find in the American Law and specifically in the second Chapter of 
the Sherman Act. These two stages of the two-tier approach were formulated for 
exclusionary practices, which were dealt in most of the cases of EU Antitrust law. 
However, the second part of the two-tier analysis can be interpreted in a broader way in 
order to cover also the exploitative abuses. 
                                                 
18 Eleanor M. Fox, “What is the harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anti-
Competitive Effect”, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.70, 2012, p. 371. 
19 Paul-John Loewenthal, loc. cit, p.457. 
20 Ibid, p.458. 
21 Peter Ulmer,‘Schranken zulässigen Wettbewerbs marktbeherrschender 
Unternehmen‘, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1977. 
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The establishment of the above mentioned two-tier analysis in Art.102 TFEU 
can be proven misleading. The two tests of whether a conduct restricts competition and 
whether this conduct can be exempted from Art.102 TFEU resembles with the analysis 
applied on Art. 101 TFEU. The ECJ has referred in many of its early cases the term of 
objective justification and in its recent cases as a factor that must be taken into 
consideration and that justifies an abuse. What is made clear in recent case law is that 
we don’t have any direct exemption from Article 102 TFEU but we can have an 
objective justification that legitimates a prima facie abuse22. 
It is interesting to analyze that the ECJ held in Ahmed Saeed and Atlantic 
Container that Article 102 TFEU does not allow for any exemptions to the prohibition it 
lays down23. However, in my opinion these cases show that if an abuse is established, 
Art. 102 TFEU applies and there is no exemption. This does not exclude the possibility 
to have a prima facie abuse that can be justified by an objective justification. Thus the 
presence of an objective justification must be regarded as an element to take into 
account when examining that a particular conduct constitutes an abuse24. Under this 
approach the objective justification can be compared to the “efficiency defence” that 
Commission uses in the merger control25. As the objective justification, the “efficiency 
defence” functions as a factor that the Commission must take into consideration when it 
decides the appraisal of mergers26. 
The above mentioned analysis also proves the differences between the two- tier 
approach followed in Article 101 and that followed in Art. 102 TFEU. If an agreement 
falls under 101 TFEU is prohibited, unless it is an exemption according to Article 
101(3) TFEU. On the contrary, under Article 102 TFEU a conduct that prohibits 
                                                 
22 Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective justification and Prima Facie 
anti-competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU Law and beyond”, PhD 
Thesis, Europa Institute, Faculty of Law, Leiden University,2014, pp.107-109, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1887/29593 (accessed 11 November 2015). 
23 Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803, para 32. See also the Opinion of AG Lenz 
in Ahmed Saeed, para 41. Lenz rejected an ‘exemption’, since ‘abuses cannot be 
approved’. See also Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container 
Line and Others v Commission (‘TACA’) [2003] ECR II-3275, para 1112. 
24 Opinion of AG Jacobs, Case C-53/03, Synetairismos Farmakopeion Aitolias & 
Akarnanias v. Glaxosmithkline AEVE, European Court Reports [2005] ECR I-4609, 
para 72. 
25 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (2004) OJ C31/5 para. 76-88. 
26 Damien Gerrard, Merger Control Policy: How to give Meaningful Consideration to 
Efficiency Claims, (2003) 40 CMLRev 1367, p.1369. 
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competition must be prohibited, unless there is an objective justification, which can be 
accepted by the ECJ.  In my opinion, we must have an abuse in order to have a reason to 
examine the existence of an objective justification and on the contrary to AG Jacob’s 
opinion that “the use of the word ‘abuse’ necessarily connotes a negative conclusion has 
been reached”27, the establishment of a prima facie abuse must be seen as a provisional 
stage during the examination of the Article 102 TFEU. If there is an objective 
justification under this relevant case, we won’t have a violation of Article 102 TFEU 
and as a result the existence of a prima facie abuse does not necessarily mean that 
Article 102 is already violated. In addition, the case law proves that a bifurcation 
between the establishment of a prima facie abuse and the objective justification is 
needed for the effective examination of Article 102 TFEU28. 
A very early example in case law that supports also this two-tier approach is the 
1989 Tournier ruling. This case concerned the fees laid down by Sacem, the 
organization that held a monopoly on the management of copyrights in France. The ECJ 
held that if Sacem’s tariffs were appreciably higher than those charged in other Member 
States, such a difference is ‘indicative’ of an abuse29. The Court also held that the 
undertaking in question has the burden to justify this difference by reference to 
“objective dissimilarities” between the situation in the specific Member State in contrast 
to other Member States. Another more recent example that confirms the importance of 
the two tier approach is Microsoft Case30, in which the Court held that must first be 
examined if there are ‘special circumstances’ that give rise to the duty of supply. If only 
there are, in that case has the examination of an objective justification a meaning and 
‘then [it must be considered] whether the justification put forward by Microsoft […] 
might prevail over those exceptional circumstances. Also in the cases British Airways 
and Post Denmark we find also the acceptance by the ECJ of this bifurcation. As a 
result, we can notice the implementation of a very similar with Article 101 and 101(3) 
                                                 
27 Opinion of AG Jacobs, op. cit. 
28 See for more details in: Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective 
justification and Prima Facie anti-competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU 
Law and beyond”, PhD Thesis, Europa Institute, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, 
pp.109-111; Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para. 709; 
British Airways (ECJ), [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 106; Case C-209/10 Post Denmark v. 
Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR I-000, para. 42; Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 
803, para. 32. 
29 Case 395/87 Ministère Public v. Tournier [1989] ECR 2521, para 38. 
30 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 709. 
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approach concerning Article 102 TFEU. By taking into consideration this two-tier 
approach, in this thesis the term “plea” will be used instead of defence because in my 
opinion the existence of a prima facie abuse does not mean that Aricle 102 TFEU has 
been already violated31. 
 
 
The utility of studying the objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU 
Before starting the examination of the scope and types of the objective 
justifications, is of high importance to understand how significantly the clear definition 
and application of objective justifications will affect the application of Article 102 
TFEU and as a result the protection of competition and consumers’ welfare, the main 
objectives of this provision and of competition law in general. 
The ECJ through its case law didn’t give an in-depth analysis of objective 
justifications. However, the Court restricts its analysis on the basis of each case analysis 
by taking into consideration the specific facts of each case and does not try to connect 
the repetitive factors and facts faced in case law in order to create a well-structured and 
clear definition of objective justifications. In my opinion, the formulation of a clear 
definition of the notion objective justification and a consistent plea can enhance the 
legal certainty32. Precisely, this will give more certainty to the companies and will also 
work as a compliance test which will help them to recognize and prevent from abusive 
conducts. In addition, it will help the Commission and the national Courts and 
                                                 
31 See e.g. in favour of this opinion Case C-95/04 P British Airways v. Commission 
[2007] ECR I-2331, para106; Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-
3601, para 709; A. Albors- Llorens, ‘The Role of Objective Justification and 
Efficiencies in the Application of Article 82 EC’, Common Market Law Review, 
Volume 44, Issue 6, 2007, p. 1747; R. Nazzini, ‘The Wood Began to Move: An Essay 
on Consumer Welfare, Evidence and Burden of Proof in Article 82 Cases’, European 
Law Review, Vol. 31, no. 4,2006,p.518. However, Whish (Richard Whish and David 
Bailey, “Competition Law”, Oxford University Press, Seventh Edition, 2012, p. 210 et 
seq.) and Paul-John Loewenthal,('The Defence of “Objective Justification” in the 
Application of Article 82 EC', World Competition 28 , Issue 4, (2005) ,Kluwer Law 
International, p. 455)refer to it as a defence. 
32 E. Østerud, Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU 
Competition Law: The Spectrum of Tests (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International 2010), p.245. 
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competition authorities to make a quality check resulting to the increase of clarity and 
legal coherence in abuse analysis33.  
Concerning the national courts and competition authorities we must take into 
consideration that after the introduction of the Regulation 1/200334 the Commission 
encouraged the private enforcement and gave to the national courts and competition 
authorities a decisive role and competences in borderline cases. As a result, in search of 
clearer and more coherent standards for anticompetitive abuses, a more uniform 
application of Art.102 TFEU by national courts and authorities will be achieved. 
Following an effective examination approach, is proposed to first apply the above 
mentioned two-tier analysis in order to find, if the conduct of an undertaking constitutes 
an abuse. Secondly, the possible objective justifications that the undertaking can 
advance must be examined along with common requirements every plea must comply 
with. Third, we must examine the anticompetitive effect of the plea through the 
proportionality test35. 
Another very important reason why to establish a clear definition of the term 
objective justifications is the relationship between Art.101TFEU and Art.102 TFEU. A 
deeper study of the objective justifications and the understanding of their scope will 
serve also the need for more consistency in the application of Art. 101 and 102 TFEU. 
There are examples of unsynchronized application these articles concerning practices 
such as single branding, tying or rebates adopted by a dominant undertaking in which 
both Articles apply but only one of them was breached36. The contradictory outcome 
occurred at the beginning of the case law concerning objective justifications due to the 
fact that efficiency gains were not accepted under Article 102 TFEU. By the application 
of the above mentioned two-tier approach this problem seems to be faced satisfactorily. 
On the other hand, there are also writers that mention the danger of overlap between the 
two provisions by transferring the applied methodology of Art.101 to Art.102 TFEU37. 
                                                 
33 T.Eilmansberger, ‘How to distinguish goodl from bad competition under Article 
82EC: In search of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses’, 
Common Market Law Review, Volume 42, pp. 129-177,2005, p.131. 
34 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (2003) OJ L1/1. 
35 Paul-John Loewenthal, op. cit, p.456. 
36 Case T-65/98(Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission) [1998] ECR II-2641. 
37 Ekaterina Rousseva, “The concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an abuse of a 
Dominant Position: Can it help to Modernise to Analysis under Article 82 EC?”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, March 2006, p.32. 
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In my opinion, we must accept that Articles 101 and 102 apply under different market 
situations. In practice it is possible to be both Articles applicable concerning a specific 
conduct but we must also take into consideration that an exemption covered by Art.101 
(3) TFEU may not constitute also an objective justification under Art.102 TFEU. In 
conclusion, it is crucial for legal certainty to clearly define the term objective 
justification under the provision of Article 102 TFEU and its objectives and not try to 
make it parallel at any case with Article 101 TFEU by transferring the methodology 
without critical examination of the similarity of the cases. They are two different 
provisions with their exceptional characteristics apart their similarities and they must be 
read and interpreted by respecting the legal consistency and certainty. 
In conclusion, by trying to answer the question “what is an objective 
justification” and “why is it so important to study them” I would also add to the above 
analyzed arguments, that it is so important for the application of Art. 102 TFEU to 
achieve an outright distinction between illegal and permissible prima facie behaviour 
because in many cases this is the main problem that the Court must solve and the 
discerning line between the two situations is so thin. It is crucial to mention that by 
taking into consideration and examining all the factors connected to a specific dominant 
position case helps to avoid the mistakes of a strict formalistic approach of Art.102 
TFEU and improves significantly the competition analysis in general. 
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The objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the types of the objective justifications, their 
general requirements along with the special characteristics and particularities of each 
category. It must be underlined that the approach to examine and find a concrete 
definition of the term of objective justification is based on the case law of the ECJ. The 
rulings of the different cases function as a base in order to categorize and clarify the 
objectives of the ECJ and the Commission and the scope behind the term objective 
justification. Due to the fact that the ECJ follows the effect-based approach indicated 
also by the Treaty and Art.102 TFEU the method followed in this case is the inductive 
reasoning from the specific to general. The main difficulty is that all the cases 
concerning a specific category e.g. predatory must be carefully studied in order to entail 
all the factors in the general definition that will be finally formed. In addition, there is 
always the fact that one special factor or situation has not been entailed because it is 
impossible in an effect based approach to consider ex ante all the cases that may occur. 
As a result it is very difficult to create a concrete definition of the term objective 
justification. On the other hand, there are some basic requirements arising from the 
ECJ’s rulings that must be satisfied in any case that we have an objective justification of 
a prima facie abusive conduct. It was thought better to first elaborate on the special 
requirements that every objective justification must follow and then proceed with 
presentation of the different types of objective justifications enhanced by case law 
examples. 
 
 
Basic requirements of an objective justification 
A thorough survey of the case-law allow us to extract three basic requirements 
that must be satisfied in every case in order to have an objectively justified prima facie 
abusive conduct. In detail, an objective justification must pursue a legitimate aim, be 
reasonable and proportionate to the aim sought. These three requirements were very 
successfully summarized in the opinion of Advocate General Kirschner in the case of 
Tetra Park I38. Kirschner said that a common feature shared by the examples of abusive 
                                                 
38 Opinion of AG Kirschner, Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, 
(1990) ECR II-309. 
  -15- 
conducts mentioned in Art.102 TFEU, is that the conduct they refer to “pursues the 
legitimate end of making profits through disproportionate means”39. 
Firstly, to understand which aim is legitimate we must remember the main 
objectives of Article 102 TFEU. The provision 102 TFEU has as main aim the 
protection of consumer welfare and the competition process40. As a result, a dominant 
undertaking must be allowed to engage in methods of “normal competition” by 
innovating its products, making the production process more efficient, achieving the 
best quality at the lowest price etc. as long as these conducts serve the two objectives. In 
addition, conducts of a dominant undertaking that meet “competition on the merits” are 
also legitimate under Article 102 TFEU41. It’s not permitted for an undertaking to force 
its competitors out of the market by improving its products and by creating barrier to 
entries as a consequence of its actions, if the intent was not to foreclose its competitors. 
When the undertaking’s primary aim is to eliminate its rivals and to exploit the 
consumers (eliminating intent), its conduct cannot be objectively justified. It can be 
assumed that the Court must very carefully discern the cases, where there is an 
eliminatory intent or an actual or potential foreclosure in order to exclude any plea for 
an objective justification42. 
Secondly, as far as the “reasonable” character of the conduct is concerned, it is 
an objective that must be satisfied in almost every case under the examination of ECJ. 
Its application is identified with the very famous from Article 30 TFEU case law “rule 
of reason”. The rule of reason was introduced by the American Law with the Sherman 
Act and it functions like the safety key of balance based on an each case evaluation by 
taking into considerations all the factors and the potential competitive harm. In other 
                                                 
39 Ibid, para. 67. 
40 T.Eilmansberger, ‘How to distinguish good from bad competition under Article 
82EC: In search of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses’, 
Common Market Law Review, Volume 42, pp. 129-177,2005,  p.132. 
41 T.Eilmansberger, loc. cit, p.140; Duncan Sinclair, “Abuse of Dominance at a 
Crossroads – Potential Effect, Object and Appreciability under Article 82”, European 
Competition Law Review 491 Volume 25, 2004, p.494; J.Vickers, “Abuse of Market 
Power”, The Economic Journal, Volume 115, Issue 504, pages F244–F261, June 2005, 
p.504,http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01004.x/abstract 
(accessed 21 December 2015) ; Case T- 201/04 Microsoft v. EC Commission [2007] 
ECR II- 3601. 
42 Luc Gyselen, “Rebates: Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?”, 8th 
Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop at the European University Institute 
in Florence on 6 June  2003, available on the European University Website at 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2003%28papers%29.shtml. 
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words the rule of reason means that it is necessary to balance the conduct’s pro- and 
anti- competitive effects and where the latter outweigh the former, the conduct will be 
unlawful43. This is the vaguest of the three requirements and a very careful distinction 
between reasonable and unreasonable is necessary. 
Thirdly, a conduct of a dominant undertaking can be objectively justified only 
when it is proportionate to the aim it seeks to achieve. The principle of proportionality 
is a core principle used by the ECJ especially in the cases where all the different factors 
must be balanced in order to decide the legitimacy or not of a conduct. This rule is 
applied in all free market cases and especially under Article 28 and 30 TFEU. As far as 
the application of proportionality rule under Article 102 TFEU is concerned, the 
conduct of the dominant undertaking must not limit competition more than necessary44. 
The aim of the undertaking company must be legitimate and suitable under the 
proportionality test.  
The proportionality test entails many different elements that must be examined 
and satisfied. The first one, the legitimacy, means to show a wider benefit to the market 
and not only to the undertaking itself45 and it is followed by the examination of 
suitability, which assesses whether the conduct is suitable to achieve the legitimate aim 
or not. The suitability works here as a first examination before the necessity test and 
when the conduct proves to be unsuitable there is no reason to approve also the 
legitimacy of the conduct. The necessity is a crucial requirement of the proportionality 
rule and the ECJ seems to put a lot of weight on it. According to the necessity test, a 
dominant firm must use the least anti-competitive means to reach its professed goal. 
From the United Brands Case the value of necessity test for the objective justifications 
under Article 102 TFEU became apparent. In the famous cases Tetra Park II, Microsoft, 
Post Denmark the ECJ gave much emphasis on the necessity test. 
The proportionality test is only completed when we apply the proportionality 
test stricto sensu, under which we “assesses whether there is an equitable balance 
between the means to achieve a professed objective, and the (potential) impact on the 
                                                 
43 Richard Whish and David Bailey, “Competition Law”, Oxford University Press, 
Seventh Edition, 2012, pp.134-136. 
44 See Cases: United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. 
Commission Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207 and Tetra Pak Rausing SA ( Tetra Pak I) v. 
Commission T-51/89 [1990] ECR II-309. 
45 Case T-66/01 ICI v. Commission [2010] ECR II-2631, para 306. 
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market”46. The proportionality stricto sensu can be proven very important in a case of an 
objective justification because it balances the pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
effects and the general effect of the conduct on the market. All the above mentioned 
individual requirements must be satisfied successively because for example there is no 
reason to apply the proportionality test, if we don’t have a legitimate and reasonable 
aim. As a result, an objective justification can not be justified, unless all these special 
requirements are satisfied. 
 
 
The types of the objective justifications 
Former Director General Lowe of the DG Competition at the 30th Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy stated that according to the 
European case-law we have three types of “objective justifications”47. Firstly, a 
dominant undertaking can argue that its conduct constitute “legitimate business 
behaviour” and therefore is objectively justified. Secondly, it can also argue that its 
behaviour serves a “legitimate public interest objective”. Finally, it can also use the 
argument that the conduct is objectively justified due to the “efficiency defence”, which 
means that the produced efficiency gains outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the 
conduct. It must also be mentioned that there are some writers that adopt a more narrow 
approach and accept only two categories of objective justifications based on the 2012 
Post Denmark judgement48. More specifically in the Post Denmark the ECJ stated that 
“a dominant undertaking may demonstrate that its conduct is objectively necessary or 
has a beneficial effect on efficiency”49. This legal opinion is also supported by the 
                                                 
46 Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective justification and Prima Facie 
anti-competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU Law and beyond”, PhD 
Thesis, Europa Institute, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, 2014, p.147, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1887/29593 (accessed 11 November 2015). 
47 Philip Lowe, DG Competition’s Review of the Policy on Abuse of Dominance, in: 
B.E. Hawk, (Ed.), International Antitrust and Policy: Annual Proceedings of the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 2003, Juris Publishing, New York, 2004, p.170-171. 
48 Case C-209/10 Post Denmark v Konkurrencerådet, op. cit, para. 41. 
49Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, para. 86; Case 
C-52/09 TeliaSonera [2011] ECR I-527, para. 76. 
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Commission’s 2008 guidance paper50, which also accepts two categories. This thesis 
accept the first legal opinion and the above mentioned three categories will be more 
analyzed and clarified by a thorough and to the point presentation of the most decisive 
cases in the interpretation of the objective justifications under Art.102 TFEU. 
 
 
Legitimate commercial conduct/ business behaviour 
The legitimate commercial conduct/ business behaviour recognized as an 
objective justification entails two different categories of expression. First, it 
encompasses the right that a dominant undertaking has to conduct under its commercial 
freedom and also competition on the merits. Secondly, we can also have a legitimate 
commercial conduct/business behaviour caused by an objective necessity. 
Beginning with the case that a dominant undertaking substantiates its legitimate 
commercial conduct/business behaviour by bringing the argument of competition on the 
merits51, there is no reason why this conduct could be abusive under Article 102 TFEU. 
Concretely, judgements BP and Deutsche Telekom confirm that the dominant 
undertakings abuse their dominant position only in the case they have recourse to 
conduct other than competition on the merits52. One can consider competition on the 
merits under two different ways. On the one hand, one can follow an effect-based 
                                                 
50 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, p. 7–20. 
51 Paul-John Loewenthal, 'The Defence of “Objective Justification” in the Application 
of Article 82 EC', World Competition 28 , Issue 4, (2005) ,Kluwer Law International, p. 
459. There are some writers that do not accept competition on the merits as an objective 
justification under Article 102 TFEU but they do consider that a competition’s 
distortion begins ‘when the eliminatory conduct is not based on the merits’. See: 
T.Eilmansberger, ‘How to distinguish good from bad competition under Article 82 EC : 
In search of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses’, op. cit, 
p.133; H.W. Friederiszick and L. Gratzà, ‘Dominant and Efficient- On the Relevance of 
Efficiencies in Abuse of Dominance Cases’, in: OECD Policy Roundtables, The Role of 
Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings 2012, (DAF/COMP(2012)23), p.38. 
52 Case T‐ 65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1993] ECR II-389 
para 94: ‘Article [102] of the Treaty prohibits a dominant undertaking from 
strengthening its position by having recourse to means other than those falling within 
competition based on merits’. In other words, this means that a dominant undertaking 
can strengthen its position when her actions are competition on the merits. See also: 
Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, para. 177; 
AstraZeneca v. Commission [2012] ECR I-0000, para. 130. 
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analysis and if the conduct proves to be beneficial on efficiency, the conduct can be 
characterized ex-post competition on the merits53. On the other hand, there is the 
possibility that a firm competes in the boundaries of its commercial freedom and this is 
competition on the merits. In this second case, we don’t need to follow an effect-based 
analysis but to follow a contextual interpretation of what a normal conduct under the 
commercial freedom of the company is. In many cases, the limit is the eliminating 
intent of a company to foreclose and damage its competitors. But only the fact that a 
dominant undertaking strengthen its position or achieved its dominance by competing 
on the merits or that some of its competitors left the market, it’s not a legitimate reason 
to accuse that company of anti-competitive behaviour and an abuse of dominance.  
There is also the case when a dominant undertaking display “the defence of 
legitimate commercial interests”54. Every dominant undertaking has the right emerging 
from its fundamental and important right of commercial freedom to take all the 
reasonable and proportionate steps in order to protect its commercial interests55. The 
Case United Brands gives the most appropriate in my opinion approach of this defence. 
Namely, the case states that “‘[t]he fact [that] an undertaking is in a dominant position 
cannot disentitle it from protecting its own commercial interests if they are attacked’56. 
On the other hand, there are some cases of the ECJ such as the British Airways57, the 
Solvay and even the BPB judgement, that narrow down the scope of the commercial 
freedom in a way they almost nullify the commercial freedom itself. Specifically, the 
General Court’s ruling in the BPB Case narrows very much the justification that a 
dominant undertaking can use by referring to each commercial freedom and the Court 
stated that the conduct can not be justified if it was “intended or likely to affect the 
structure of a market”58. In my opinion, the restriction of the commercial freedom that 
also a dominant undertaking has, may even have as a result the distortion of 
competition, enhance anti-competitive effects and endanger the consumers’ welfare. It’s 
                                                 
53  Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera [2011] ECR I-527, para. 81; Case C-209/10 Post Denmark 
v Konkurrencerådet, op. cit, para.41. 
54 Case 27/26, United Brands Co and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission, 
[1978] ECR 207, para. 189. 
55 A. Albors-Llorens, ‘The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the 
Application of Article 82 EC’, op. cit, p. 1741. 
56 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, para 189. 
57British Airways v. Commission [2007] ECR I-2331  , para 243; 
58  Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum v. Commission [1993] ECR II-389 
, para. 117-118. See, for a similarly stringent approach, Case T-203/01 Michelin v. 
Commission (‘Michelin II’) [2003] ECR II-4071, para. 239-241. 
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totally wrong to see every attempt of the dominant undertaking to protect its 
commercial position as an attempt to strengthen its dominance. Otherwise, the dominant 
firms will have no incentive for innovation and improvement of their products and 
prices resulting to negative effects on competition and on the functioning of the market. 
As it was mentioned above, the objective justification of the legitimate business 
behaviour applies also in the case where a dominant undertaking is forced to act under 
such a way due to an objective necessity59. According to the Commission’s guidance for 
the interpretation of Art.102 TFEU, the conduct of the undertaking must be “objectively 
justified” and this means that the conduct is justified by “factors external to the 
undertaking”. Namely, the objective necessity can function as an objective justification 
in the case for example of force majeure or in a state of state compulsion in which the 
dominant undertaking didn’t have any other chance to act differently60. The objective 
necessity justification is also accepted in the case that an undertaking acts in such a way 
due to technical or commercial considerations. In such a case there is big similarity with 
the first category of legitimate business behaviour as long as it also seems to emerge 
from the commercial freedom of the undertaking. However, it is of high importance to 
keep this distinction between the commercial freedom and the objective necessity, 
because in the first one the dominant undertaking has a degree of freedom, whereas in 
the case of objective necessity the dominant undertaking could not have act differently. 
A characteristic example of objective necessity justification is the Telemarketing 
case61. The ECJ in this case told that in this case the refusal to supply can be justified by 
technical and commercial reasons concerning the nature of television. In addition, in a 
more recent case the ECJ follows the same ruling and specifically in Telekomunikacja 
Polska62 the Court stated that the objective necessity justification is always based on 
external to the undertaking’s conduct factors and must also comply with proportionality 
test. The objective necessity justification under the category of legitimate business 
behaviour was very often used in case-law concerning the refusal to deal. It worths 
mentioning that the ECJ accepted to grant the justification in case where the dominant 
                                                 
59 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, para 28. 
60  Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, op. cit, p.118. 
61 Case 311/84 CBEM v. CLT and IPB (‘Télémarketing’) [1985] ECR 3261, para 26-
27. 
62 COMP/39,525, Telekomunikacjia Polska 22 June 2011, para. 874, on appeal Case T-
486/11, ruling 17 December 2015, judgement pending. 
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undertaking reserved an ancillary activity due to commercial and technical reasons on a 
neighbouring market on which it had a dominant position63. Furthermore, in the famous 
case of the port of Rødby64 the Commission discussed that there could be also natural 
limitations and concluded that in that case the reservation of an ancillary service(port 
facility) by a sole undertaking and the refusal to grant access to other competitors can 
not be accepted without any objective justification or technical or commercial 
constraints. 
It is also interesting to entail in this analysis some examples of the cases where 
we have a state’s intervention that does not allow the dominant undertaking to act by 
exercising its commercial freedom but forces it to a specific conduct. First, this is 
obvious in a case of force majeure in which the rationale is that an abuse demands the 
autonomous conduct of the undertaking and the freedom of choice. The UK Aberdeen 
Journals65 Case follows exactly this rationale. Namely, in the UK the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) examined below average cost prices in the advertisement space in 
journals. The UK Aberdeen Journals was examined for below the average variable cost 
prices but in this case the OFT accepted the objective justification that the Aberdeen 
Journals that period had extremely high costs due to a threat of industrial action and 
there was no intend to use predatory pricing for damaging its competitors. 
A crucial question that must be also examined is what happens in the case where 
the objective necessity emerges from state’s compulsion? The examination must start by 
answering what degree of state’s compulsion the undertaking faces and how leeway has 
itself. Article 102 TFEU requires that undertakings make the most of their leeway in 
order to prevent a restriction of competition66. The plea will not succeed, if the conduct 
is simply supported by the national law. On the contrary, the situation is different when 
                                                 
63 Case 18/88 RTT v. GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941, para 18. 
64 Commission decision 94/119/EC, Port of Rødby, OJ [1994] L 55/52. 
65 See the OFT decision of 25 September 2002, Aberdeen Journals (remitted case), Case 
CA98/14/2002, upheld by the CAT in Aberdeen Journals v. Director General of Fair 
Trading [2003] CAT 11. 
66 Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective justification and Prima Facie 
anti-competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU Law and beyond”, op. cit, 
p.120. Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, para 107 
and 121; Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v. Commission 
[1980] ECR 3125, para. 130-131; Joined Cases 240/82 to 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 
268/82 and 269/82 Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 
3831, paragraphs 27‐29; Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission and 
France v. Ladbroke Racing [1997] ECR I-6265, para. 34-35; Case T-513/93 Consiglio 
nazionale degli spedizionieri doganali v. Commission ECR II-1810, para 61. 
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there are national measures that don’t allow an autonomous decision and conduct and 
especially in the case where these measures are not obviously infringing the European 
law67. In the case where the national law is incompatible with the EU law the 
undertaking must not implement it as long as the EU primary law is superior to national 
law. In Ladbroke case the Court stated that national law does not apply if it impedes 
free competition completely68. There are two very important arguments that support this 
ruling of the court. Firstly, the Article 102 TFEU forbids as abusive only conducts that 
come from the dominant undertaking and therefore it does not apply when the conduct 
is imposed by the state. Secondly, Article 102 TFEU regulates conducts and not 
measures taken by the state69. Article 106 TFEU is the one that regulates measures and 
specifically exclusionary rights given to undertakings by the state. To sum up, the 
relatively old case of BP70 deserves reading because it is very enlightening for 
understanding all these distinction of legitimate business behaviour and its boundaries. 
The ECJ said that the refusal of BP Petroleum to supply a Deutsch Independent central 
buying organization, ABG, was objectively justified on the basis of lack of capacity to 
continue to supply. 
 
 
Efficiencies 
The efficiency plea was assumed very controversial and debatable between 
scholars, as long as there is no explicit exception in the provision 102 TFEU and. even 
the ECJ seemed not to accept it as an objective justification in the early case-law. The 
efficiencies found prosperous ground to be accepted as objective justifications on the 
Commission’s 2009 Guidance Paper71. That happened because with this Guidance the 
                                                 
67 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, para 81; E. 
Blomme, ‘State Action as a Defence Against 81 and 82 EC’, World Competition, 
Volume 30, Issue 2, pp. 243–261, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 243;Whish, op. 
cit, p. 135. 
68 Ladbroke Racing,op.cit, para. 33-34. 
69 See e.g. Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficias de Contas v Autoridade da 
Concorrência [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:81 , para 54. 
70 BP v The Commission, Case 77/77 [1978] ECR 1513. 
71 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, para 28. For a view supporting the effects‐ based approach, see e.g. 
Competition Law Forum Article 82 Review Group, ‘The Reform of Article 82: 
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Commission chooses to follow an effects-based approach instead of the former form-
based approach. The Guidance supports an economic analysis concerning abuse cases 
and it complies with the basis of efficiency plea which is the link between economic 
efficiency and consumer’s welfare72. In addition, the Guidance Paper entails the 
efficiency defence in its body and also provides for four cumulative requirements that 
must be fulfilled in order to accept the plea73. 
In early cases of the ECJ such as the Hoffmann-La Roche74, the Michelin I75and 
Michelin II76 there is the first degree of hope that the efficiency plea will be recognized 
as an objective justification by the Court. The British Airways Case shows for the first 
time with more certainty that we can apply an efficiency balancing test under Article 
102 TFEU77. In this case the Court confirmed for the first time that there is an efficiency 
plea and this pro efficiency ruling is said to have been achieved after a long debate 
between the judges78. Namely, in British Airways the Court stated that even where there 
is an ‘exclusionary effect’, such an effect ‘may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by 
advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer”79. This ruling 
showed that if a dominant undertaking prevails in the market against its competitors due 
to its superior efficiency, this is not itself an abusive conduct and if all the legal 
requirements regarding efficiency are fulfilled, the conduct is objectively justified. It 
must also be mentioned that this case was criticized80for not complying precisely with 
the Guidance because British airways Case requires that the efficiencies “also benefit 
                                                                                                                                               
Recommendations on Key Policy Objectives’, (2005) European Competition Journal 
179, p.180-182. 
72 Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective justification and Prima Facie 
anti-competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU Law and beyond”, Europa 
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73 Guidance Paper, loc. cit, para. 30. 
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Communities (1979), ECR 461, para 90. 
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consumers”, whereas the Guidance requires the net effect on consumer welfare must be 
at least neutral. 
The conditions regarding efficiencies laid down in Paragraph 30 of the 
Commission’s Guidance were more satisfactory adopted by the Post Denmark case. 
This case held that: ‘it is for the dominant undertaking to show that the efficiency gains 
likely to result from the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains 
have been, or are likely to be, brought about as a result of that conduct, that such 
conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in efficiency and that it does not 
eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or 
potential competition’81. This ruling sets a more precise legal framework in which the 
objective justification of efficiencies can apply. 
This case also shows that we must apply a balancing test between the negative 
and positive effects of the conduct and not only on consumers’ welfare but on the 
competition process broadly. This approach resembles the application of Article 101(3) 
which also talks about the benefit of consumer and efficiency. For one more time the 
need for consistency with Article 101(3) leads this defence to be built on the model of 
Article 101(3) TFEU. Although, this approach may enhance consistency between 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, there are arguments that claim that this is a clear 
transposition of Article 101(3) TFEU in Article 102 TFEU and that a provision 
designed purely for negotiated agreements between undertakings is not suitable for ex-
post application to the unilateral conduct of dominant undertakings where the theory of 
harm is far more difficult to prove82. In my opinion, the problem is not to accept that we 
must take efficiencies into account, when we examine a prima facie abuse case under 
Article 102 TFEU, because it is not only demanded by the need for consistency between 
the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but also by the paragraph 30 of the Commission’s 
Guidance Paper and the general effect-based analysis followed by the ECJ and the 
Commission. On the contrary, the main problem is to define what efficiencies are and 
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which precise requirements must be fulfilled and at what stage of our analysis they must 
be taken into account. 
The difficulty with efficiency plea is that it is a manifold term that includes 
different perspectives. To illustrate these perspectives, we can have allocative efficiency 
(output maximization), productive efficiency (cost maximization) and dynamic 
efficiency (innovation maximization). In order to perceive correctly these terms and to 
make the right choice when a case is examined, there is the need of understanding their 
objectives and to take into consideration all the factors by balancing and by examining 
whether the conduct has a net beneficial effect on the efficiency83. In practice, an 
abusive conduct almost always entails a loss in allocative efficiency and arises the 
question whether this loss can be covered by productive and dynamic efficiencies84. For 
example, in the case British Airways the ECJ examined the productive efficiencies by 
trying to see ways that minimize the costs85. On the other hand, in Microsoft Case86 the 
ECJ examined the incentives for innovation and as a result the dynamic efficiencies. By 
a systematic examination of the relevant case law it comes out that in the cases where 
we face the refusal to deal that allocative efficiency is reduced as the output is reduced 
and the prices become higher but simultaneously we gain in dynamic efficiencies, 
because the incentive to invest is boosted. Characteristic examples we can find in case 
that we have the refusal to give the license of an IP right87. Namely, in the leading case 
Magill the ECJ established that three conditions should be met in order for a refusal to 
license to be abusive, one of which is the absence of objective justification for the 
refusal88. The following also famous cases: IMS and Microsoft made more concrete all 
these conditions concerning objective justifications based on the efficiency plea. 
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The examination of the efficiency may seem simple and the process quite 
precise, but on the other side it entails many interpretative difficulties even in defining 
which category of efficiency we have89. We must take into consideration that there is a 
kind of conflict of interests between the different perspectives of efficiencies. To 
examine it more precisely, the productive efficiencies allow a more stable and 
predictable process of examination and as a result there are more easily quantified. On 
the other hand, the dynamics efficiencies due to their character always entail uncertain 
benefits in the future90. As a result, if we want a system based on reliable and quantified 
effects, only productive efficiencies should be accepted as an objective justification 
under Art.102 TFEU. However, it must not be ignored that the incentives of innovation 
are proven to be more beneficial to consumers’ welfare. Commission in case law seems 
to encourage also dynamic efficiencies by showing that is a mistake to be excluded 
from Art.102 TFEU and there must apply a well-organized balancing test. This 
balancing test must be based both on “magnitude” of the effects and on the “likelihood” 
with which they are to arise91. This approach is not only the very best solution in those 
situations but it also underlines the main reason why efficiencies must be included in 
the objective justifications of Art.102 TFEU. Because in all these cases the conduct of 
the dominant undertaking has some anti-competitive effects that are finally legitimized 
by the fact that they are weighed by the pro-competitive effects and as a result don’t 
endanger consumers’ welfare.92 
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Public Interest 
The defence that a dominant undertaking is pursuing a “legitimate public interest 
objective” is the third category of objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU. 
However, in practice and especially at the beginning of the relevant case law seems that 
both the Commission and the ECJ are very reluctant to approve this justification 
following strictly their effect-based analysis93. The public interest defence should be 
taken into consideration every time a prima facie abuse is examined under Article 102 
TFEU. However, the skepticals against this approach usually state that sometimes 
public interest is concerned with non-economic values. In my opinion, the distinction 
between pure economic and non-economic values regarding public interest is very 
difficult and sometimes not feasible and therefore can be misleading in this case and 
lead us to wrong results. 
Specifically, in theory there are cases where we evaluate values that seem non-
economic, under economic terms94. For example, if a company offers a service that 
have some negatives externalities to the environment but it is very important for the 
society of the consumers, we would balance the benefits of this conduct and the effect 
on the environment. If the benefits outweigh the environmental negative externalities by 
enhancing consumer welfare, we will approve the conduct of this undertaking by 
enforcing additional protecting measures for the environment in order to minimize the 
degree of pollution. In that case, we resort to the application of efficiency balancing test 
that was analyzed above and with this cost-benefit analysis we evaluate under economic 
terms values that are at the beginning assumed non-economic. The main problem here is 
not the economic or non-economic character of these values, because in theory is most 
of the times possible to resort to this efficiency balancing test, but the main difficulty is 
to calculate in practice precisely these values and their effects. The problem can become 
very clear with an example concerning again the environment. A survey that examines 
the harm of a conduct on the environment in order to be accurate and complete must 
also examine the effects of this conduct and the impact on the future generations. But 
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can we calculate with accuracy this future harm?95 There are no sufficient data provided 
for an all-inclusive balancing in this case96. As a result, we can efficiently evaluate all 
the present data but we cannot be sure about the future data and our examination may be 
proved inaccurate in the future. 
Another significant argument against the approval of public interests as 
objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU is the existence of values which, from 
an ethical point of view, we do not want to translate them into economic terms. This 
may be the strongest argument of those who don’t agree with the approval of the public 
interests as objective justifications. And in addition, they state that we can not measure 
everything on the basis of how beneficial is for the welfare and they debate also on the 
nature of the wealth and if it constitutes a value97. Even if we accept this fact that exist 
also values with an ethical content and they can not all have as an objective the 
welfare98 , in my opinion, we should not forbid dominant undertakings to bring public 
interests as an objective justification and Article 102 TFEU should entail these 
considerations for examination in a case of prima facie abuse, even if the basic objective 
of competition is not public interest. I would analyze thoroughly my arguments in order 
to prove this necessity. 
Firstly, The ECJ has consistently held that the competition rules must be 
interpreted in light of the principles and objectives of the EU99. Indeed, the ECJ stated 
that “the competition rules are essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to 
the EU’’100. These tasks are laid down in Article 3(3) TEU and Article 9 TFEU and they 
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go beyond consumers’ welfare and entail objectives that concern public interests. 
Article 9 TFEU provides that, in defining and implementing its policies and activities, 
the EU should take into account requirements linked for example to “the promotion of a 
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, and a high level 
of protection of human health”. Article 3(3) TEU provides that the EU shall work for, 
inter alia, ‘sustainable development’, ‘social progress’ and ‘a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment’. All these objectives influence the 
application of competition and the recent and famous case Preussen Elektra101 proves 
this influence and the changing approach of ECJ on the subject. In Preussen Elektra the 
ECJ found that these restrictions can be justified by the aim of the regime which is the 
environmental protection and the specific characteristics of the EU electricity market at 
that time. Specifically, the Court stated that the increased use of renewables of energy 
sources is a central part of the EU’s commitment to tackle climate change. In addition, 
this is also beneficial for the environment. The message conveyed by this judgment is 
clear: the Court was, is and probably will remain deferential towards the protection of 
public interests which are important for the EU itself as well, in particular as regards 
combatting climate change. Another recent case, the Kanal 5 follows the same 
approach. The ECJ held that an objective justification within the meaning of Art. 102 
TFEU ‘may arise, in particular, from the task and method of financing public service 
undertakings’102. 
Secondly, another reason that proves that we must entail public interests in the 
examination of a prima facie abuse under Article 102 TFEU is the need for a 
harmonized interpretation of the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In order to secure 
coherence and legal certainty in European competition we must take into consideration 
the connections between the two different provisions. As a result, public interests are 
taken into consideration in Article 101 TFEU and it will be a harm to the coherence and 
legal certainty if we exclude them by Article 102TFEU. Thirdly, in the two well-known 
Article 102 cases Hilti and Tetra Park103 the ECJ examined a justification plea that an 
exclusionary practice was necessary for the protection of public health and safety, 
which constitute both public interests. The Court rejected this plea because in this case 
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public health was already protected by a government body and by various regulation. 
However, this rejection by the Court does not mean a rejection of public interests as a 
matter of law under Article 102 TFEU but was based on the facts and on the contrary 
this case constitutes the base for the approval of public interests as objective 
justification for Article 102 TFEU. The above briefly debate on the approval of public 
interests remains still open and very relevant due to the new environmental policy 
measures that raised many legal matters concerning competition law and regulatory 
policy. This subject will be briefly analyzed in the following chapter with emphasis on 
the application of Article 102 and its objective justifications. 
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Environmental Protection and Competition Law 
Relevance of environmental protection considerations to the notion of objective 
justification under Article 102TFEU 
The introduction of new environmental policy has raised many legal problems in 
the competition law field because almost all of the times the environmental policy is 
contradictory to competition policy. This thesis will examine the interrelation between 
the requirements of the Article 102 TFEU concerning especially its objective 
justifications and the environmental protection factors. The main question and problem 
that occurs in this case is whether the protection of the environment should function as 
an objective justification under Article 102 TFEU, under which conditions and 
generally at what extent can regulatory policy intervene and limit competition law. The 
environmental protection factor as an objective justification is of course a public interest 
and the examination of its approval under Article 102 TFEU will be based on the third 
category of objective justifications, i.e. the public interest objective, which was in 
Chapter 2 analysed. 
As it was in the first chapter well analyzed, the ECJ and the Commission 
especially after the publication of the Commission’s Guidance Paper follow an effect-
based analysis for the examination of Article 102 TFEU by taking into consideration in 
each case all the economics factors. The environmental protection which is a non-
economic value can be in theory interpreted under economic terms as it was argued in 
Chapter 2 in more details. Namely, if a dominant undertaking is engaged in a restrictive 
conduct aimed at improving environmental protection, this is (or should be) relevant to 
whether such conduct qualifies as an exclusionary abuse104. According to the efficiency 
balancing test ( in Chapter 2 analysed) the implications of a dominant undertaking’s 
behaviour must be taken into account at an economic level in assessing the impact of 
this prima facie abusive conduct on the efficiency and on consumer welfare. The 
restrictive effects on competition must be taken into account in the balancing of pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects of the environmental protective conduct. In 
addition, as in every case of objective justification, all the general requirements of 
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objective justifications must apply also here and especially the proportionality test. As a 
result, if we assume that in a market case we have lower prices concerning an 
environmental friendly product with the objective of environment’s protection and this 
is the suitable way and there is no less restrictive way of achieving this aim, this 
conduct must not be seem an abusive behaviour and infringement under Article 102 
TFEU. Under this approach, we accept the environmental protection as an objective 
justification under Article 102 TFEU and we apply the efficiencies balancing test 
complying with the effect-based analysis and respecting the proportionality principle. 
There are two very recent cases that faced the interrelation between the 
environmental policies. One of them is the Deutsches System Deutschland DSD case105 
. Namely , the DSD charged a fee for all the packaging bearing its “Green Dot” logo 
even in the cases that it was clear that the customer does not use DSD packaging and its 
service106.  That case is very important because it does not only show that the Court 
takes into consideration the environmental factors during the examination of an 
objective justification under Article 102 TFEU but it is mainly important for showing 
that the successful promotion of an environmental policy, the relevant each time 
environmental sector must be competitive, efficient and innovative107. In case COBAT 
Italy had granted the exclusive right( application of Article 106 (2) TFEU) within Italy 
to a consortium to collect, stock and sell batteries and other waste containing lead, with 
the goal of achieving a high collection rate. Certain of COBAT’s activities, however, 
went beyond what was necessary to fulfil its task by infringing again the proportionality 
test.  
It is also very interesting to imagine based on the above analysed approach how 
the ECJ will examine the environmental considerations under the different categories of 
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abuses. For example, if we take the case of refusal to supply or to grant access to an 
essential facility, this refusal to an existing customer without an objective justification 
will be abusive108. For instance, in this situation the environmental constraints may be 
taken into account in examining whether access to the essential facility is indispensable 
to the requestor’s business. In the judgment in Bronner case, the ECJ held that the test 
of indispensability will depend upon the presence of “technical, legal or even economic 
obstacles” to the creation of a similar facility by the requestor, if necessary in 
conjunction with other undertakings109. One could here claim that the application of 
environmental regulations might, for instance, create legal obstacles preventing the 
building of an additional airport or railway line on a given route. In addition, a dominant 
undertaking could legitimately refuse to supply, or to grant access to an essential 
facility, to an undertaking whose practices are objectively extremely environmentally 
dangerous. Alternatively, a dominant undertaking might refuse to grant access to an 
essential facility to an existing customer concerning the supply of a certain resource, 
because of the risk of exhausting or overusing this resource. This would be claimed 
based on the existing notion of objective justification inherent in judgments such as 
Commercial Solvents and Bronner110. These examples are very usual and important 
especially in the energy sector where there are essential facilities and the need for access 
to the network (bottleneck cases). 
 
 
Environmental and competition policy, do they work in the same way? 
The environmental constraints that a dominant undertaking can take and their 
approval or not under the Article 102 TFEU raise the very important issue of the 
interrelation generally between environmental policy and the European competition 
law. As it was above argued the environmental considerations must be entailed in the 
examination of objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU, but in order to have a 
better understanding of this legal issue it is necessary to examine the connection of 
environmental regulation and competition law in general and put some limits on this 
interconnection in order to avoid the distortion of competition by the environmental 
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regulation. And, further, Art. 11 TFEU sets out the integration of environmental 
protection into the European Community’s policies, including competition policy111.  
The legal basis for the environmental protection can be found in the 
constitutional European law, in the Treaties and the right of the protection of the 
environment is also included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 37), which is 
legally binding (Art. 6 TEU). Specifically, in Article 7 TFEU is laid down the 
obligation of the European Union (EU) to ensure the consistency between its policies 
and activities, taking all of its objectives into account. Furthermore, the EU shall work 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth, aiming 
at a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment (Art. 3.3 
TEU). All these provisions constitute European constitutional law and they are 
mandatory. As a result they prove the legitimacy of the environmental objectives and 
the obligation to be taken into consideration not only under Article 102 TFEU but also 
in competition law. On the other hand, we must not forget that the internal market is one 
of the core objectives in EU law (Art.3.3 TFEU) and the fulfillment of the internal 
market cannot be achieved without competition law (Art. 3(1) b)112. Consequently, as 
long as there is no supremacy between policies, it is crucial to answer the question at 
which extent is acceptable for the environmental policy to intervene in competition law 
and to distort it.113 
The environmental regulation is most of the times contradictory to competition 
law and the application of it put constraints on free competition. For instance, if we 
examine the energy markets where the protection of the environment plays an important 
role we will find many “infringements” of competition, which sometimes are 
considered legitimate under the objective of environmental protection. This case opens 
a discussion on the issue whether the clearly discriminating practices of the subsidy 
system concerning the companies that produce renewable energy could be justified 
based on legal grounds and by the objective of environmental protection. These special 
regimes for renewables can be explained by the high cost of investing in renewables and 
sustaining the energy infrastructure and by the necessity of a reliable planning. 
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However, these national subsidy regimes have an effect on intra-EU trade, constitute a 
violation of competition law and have consequences on cross-border grid load due to 
national feed-in for renewables and on capacity markets for conventional energy 
sources. In addition, the environmental state aid also distorts competition in the market 
by favouring specific companies or group of companies and make it very difficult for 
the competitors. It is also important to mention that the exclusive rights granted by the 
state to companies for providing environmental activities (e.g. waste recovery) have a 
very strong anti-competitive effect on the relevant market. 
The above mentioned examples show that the environmental regulation has in its 
core these so called market-based instruments in order to achieve the protection of the 
environment. These measures, either they have the form of state aid, special levies, tax 
or feed-in tariffs, aim to correct the market failures114 in an cost- effective way by 
influencing the prices or by quantitative limits on certain activities (emission trading)115. 
This means distortion of competition by favouring some companies in the detriment of 
others116. In addition, it occurs that competition’s objectives are the consumers’ welfare 
and the competition itself, meaning the proper function of the market whereas the 
environmental policy’s main objective is the protection of the environment by 
minimizing the environmental harm. It is very difficult to balance these different 
objectives but there is no doubt that a trade-off between environmental and competition 
law must be found. 
The regulation policy must aim to limit as far as possible the negative effects on 
competition. The legislator in order to protect the environment must not forget to take 
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into consideration the function of the whole market and the competition rules. The cost 
of the distortion of competition must be outweighed by the implementation of the 
environmental goals based on an economic analysis of the regulatory measures117. 
Every discriminatory measure or justification that is used for the protection of the 
environment must be legitimate only when it is based on objective and reasonable 
criteria and it complies with the principle of proportionality and non-discrimination 
principle. On the other, the environmental factors must be accepted by competition law 
in a very restrictive way. Competition law must lose its independency and serve the 
environmental policy118. The environmental goals must be protected by competition law 
only at the extent where the proper functioning of the market is secured. Specifically, 
the abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU can be only justified when according to 
the efficiency balancing test that was in the previous chapter described assures that 
benefits by the environmental protection outweigh the anti-competitive effect on the 
market and that it doesn’t affect the proper functioning of the market. The criteria must 
be precise and reasonable and the application of the economic effect-based  analysis that 
is also promoted by the Commission the last years will help to face the legal difficulties 
that occur in those cases and take the correct decision by securing the protection of 
competition. 
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Conclusions  
The analysis in this Thesis has shed light on the central research question, 
namely what it means to justify a prima facie abusive conduct that would otherwise be 
contrary to the competition rules, and which is the content and the scope of an objective 
justification under Article 102 TFEU. 
The key lessons that I deduce from this research are the following: 
 
1.The ECJ and the Commission has not yet fully clarified the scope of the 
concept of objective justification of an abuse of dominant position and as a 
result there is a low level of legal certainty and predictability concerning this 
legal term. In addition, from a close examination of the case law concerning 
objective justifications the Court’s perception of this legal term seems to be very 
narrow  and to be related to objective factors and to public policy  that are 
beyond the control of the undertaking. The intensive application of the effect-
based analysis especially after the publication of the Commission’s Guidance 
2005 gave a more clear perception of the provision and I hope that the next years 
we will have an even more concrete definition of the terms of abuse, dominant 
position, and objective justifications under the Article 102 TFEU. 
2.The way in which justifications function varies, as we showed by the analysis 
of the requirements and the different types of justifications in Chapter 2, 
according to the circumstances ( case to case based analysis) such as the degree 
of dominance, the kind of abuse, the type of the objective justification and the 
general economic factors in the relevant market. If a conduct is in the framework 
of legitimate business conduct and meets competition on the merits, must not be 
characterized as abusive. In addition, if there is a case of objective necessity 
under the dominant undertaking was not autonomous to act in another way e.g. 
force majeure, the conduct is objectively justified and as a result legitimate. As 
far as efficiencies are concerned, the efficiency balancing test must apply and if 
the benefits compensate consumers for the anti-competitive aspects of the 
conduct, then the conduct is legitimate. The biggest difference between 
efficiencies and legitimate business conduct regarding the methodology is that in 
the case of efficiencies we must always make an intricate analysis on the effects. 
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In my opinion, the ECJ is still little reluctant in front of the justifications of 
legitimate business behaviour and efficiencies. The Court shall take more into 
consideration these two different types of objective justifications and do not 
characterize abusive a conduct that fulfill all the above mentioned and analyzed 
requirements by falling in the false formalistic approach of the existence of 
abuse and dominance.  
3.As far as the third category of objective justifications, namely public interests 
is concerned, the Court seems that was very reluctant and not willing to justify 
on this basis a prima facie abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU. In my 
opinion, this approach seems to change especially due to fact that the protection 
of the environment, which constitutes a public interest, is nowadays a core 
objective of the European policies and of the Treaties. It occurs as a necessity 
nowadays to take into consideration social aspects under the examination of 
Article 102 TFEU but always at that extent that competition objectives are 
secured and fulfilled. This thesis shows that the distortion of competition is also 
at the core of the environmental protection. On the one hand, regulation has to 
avoid or at least minimize the distortion of competition as much as possible. On 
the other hand competition law shall take into account environmental goals to a 
very limited extent otherwise its ability to protect the market and consumers’ 
welfare is reduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  -39- 
Bibliography 
Books 
Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law- Text Cases and Materials, 
Oxford University Press, Fifth Edition, 2014. 
D.Walbroeck, “The Assessment of Efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU and the 
Commission’s Guidance Paper” in Etro and Kokkoris (eds.), Competition Law and the 
Enforcement of Article 102 , Oxford University Press, 2010. 
K. Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Peter Ulmer ,‘Schranken zulässigen Wettbewerbs marktbeherrschender 
R.Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law, The Objectives and 
Principles of Article 102 TFEU, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Richard Whish and David Bailey, “Competition Law”, Oxford University Press, 
Seventh Edition, 2012, pp. 179-181. 
Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, The Free Press, First Edition, 1993. 
Unternehmen‘, Gebundene Ausgabe, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1977. 
 
Articles, Papers, Studies 
 
 
Ahlborn and Padilla, ‘From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment of 
Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in European Competition Law Annual 
2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC ,Hart Publishing, 2008, eds Ehlermann 
and Marquis. 
Albors- Llorens, ‘The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the 
Application of Article 82 EC’, Common Market Law Review, Volume 44, Issue 6, 
2007. 
C. Townley, ‘Inter-Generational Impacts in Competition Analysis: remembering those 
not yet born’, European Competition Law Review, Volume 11, 2011 
C. Townley, ‘Is Anything more Important than Consumer Welfare (in Article 81 EC)? 
Reflections of a Community lawyer’, (2007-2008) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies. 
  -40- 
D Wilsher, ‘Reducing Carbon Emissions in the Electricity Sector: a Challenge for 
Competition Policy Too? An Analysis of Experience to Date and Some Suggestions for 
the future’, The Competition Law Review , Volume 6,  Issue 1, pp 31-49, December 
2009. 
Damien Gerrard, Merger Control Policy: How to give Meaningful Consideration to 
Efficiency Claims, (2003) 40 CMLRev 1367. 
Duncan Sinclair, “Abuse of Dominance at a Crossroads – Potential Effect, Object and 
Appreciability under Article 82”, European Competition Law Review 491, Volume 25, 
2004. 
E. Blomme, ‘State Action as a Defence Against 81 and 82 EC’, World Competition, 
Volume 30, Issue 2, pp. 243–261, Kluwer Law International, 2007. 
E. Østerud, Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU 
Competition Law: The Spectrum of Tests, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International 2010. 
Ekaterina Rousseva, “The concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an Abuse of a 
Dominant Position: Can it help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82 EC?”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, March 2006. 
Eleanor M. Fox, “What is the harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anti-
Competitive Effect”, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.70, 2012. 
H.W. Friederiszick and L. Gratzà, ‘Dominant and Efficient- On the Relevance of 
Efficiencies in Abuse of Dominance Cases’, in: OECD Policy Roundtables, The Role of 
Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings 2012, (DAF/COMP (2012)23). 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/13497 (accessed 21 November 2015). 
J.Vickers, “Abuse of Market Power”, The Economic Journal, Volume 115, Issue 504, 
pages F244–F261, June 2005, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2005.01004.x/abstract (accessed 21 December 2015). 
Jose´ Carlos Laguna de Paz, “Protecting the Environment without Distorting 
Competition”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2012. 
K. Gillingham, R. G. Newell, K. Palmer, Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy, 
Discussion Paper, RFF DP 09-13, April 2009. 
K. Tosza, ‘Efficiencies in Art. 82 EU: An illusionary defence?’ (2009) Concurrences: 
Law & Economics 35. 
  -41- 
Kallaugher and Sher ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti- Competition Effects and Exclusionary 
Abuse under Article 82’ (2004) 25 ECLR 263. 
Kingston, Suzanne Elizabeth Joy, ‘The role of environmental protection in EC 
competition law and policy’, PhD Thesis, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, 2009, 
Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, “Article 82 EC: Where are we coming from and where are we 
going to?”, The Competition Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2, March 2006, pp.9-11. 
Luc Gyselen, “Rebates: Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?”, 8th 
Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop at the European University Institute 
in Florence on 6 June  2003, available on the European University Website at 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2003%28papers%29.shtml. 
Paul-John Loewenthal, 'The Defence of “Objective Justification” in the Application of 
Article 82 EC', World Competition, Volume 28, Issue 4, (2005), Kluwer Law 
International. 
Philip Lowe, DG Competition’s Review of the Policy on Abuse of Dominance, in: 
B.E. Hawk, (Ed.), International Antitrust and Policy: Annual Proceedings of the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 2003, Juris Publishing, New York, 2004. 
R Betz, T Sanderson, T Ancev, ‘In or out: efficient inclusion of installations in an 
emissions trading scheme?’ (2010) 37 Journal of Regulatory Economics, Volume 37. 
R. Nazzini, ‘The Wood Began to Move: An Essay on Consumer Welfare, Evidence 
and Burden of Proof in Article 82 Cases’, European Law Review, Vol. 31, no. 4, 2006.  
R.A. Posner, ‘The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman’, (1980) 9 
J. Legal Stud. 
R.M. Dworking, ‘Is Wealth A Value?’, (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 
T.Eilmansberger, ‘How to distinguish good from bad competition under Article 82EC: 
In search of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses’, Common 
Market Law Review, Volume 42, pp. 129-177,2005. 
Venit, ‘Article 82: The Last Frontier– Fighting Fire with Fire’, (2005) 28 Fordham 
International Law Journal . 
Vijver, Tjarda Desiderius Oscar van der, “Objective justification and Prima Facie anti-
competitive unilateral conduct: an exploration of EU Law and beyond”, PhD Thesis, 
Europa Institute, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, 2014, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1887/29593 (accessed 11 November 2015). 
 
  -42- 
Cases  
 
BP v The Commission, Case 77/77 [1978] ECR 1513 
Case 18/88 RTT v. GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941 
Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. 
Commission [1978] ECR 207 
Case 311/84 CBEM v. CLT and IPB (‘Telemarketing’) [1985] ECR 3261 
Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v. Commission, [1983] 
ECR 3461  
Case 395/87 Ministère Public v. Tournier [1989] ECR 2521 
Case 62/86 Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 
Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803 
Case 77/77 BP v. Commission [1978] ECR 1513 
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461 
Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficias de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência 
[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:81 
Case C-109/03 KPN v. OPTA [2004] ECR I-11273 
Case C-209/10 Post Denmark v. Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR I-000 
Case C‐260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925 
Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555 
Case C-322/81 Michelin v. Commission (‘Michelin I’) [1983] ECR 3461 
Case C-344/98 Masterfoods v. HB Ice Cream [2000] ECR I-11369 
Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099 
Case C-385/07 P, Der Grüne Punkt- Duales System Deutschland GmbH v. 
Commission [2009] ECR I-6155 
Case C‐457/10 P, AstraZeneca v. Commission [2012] ECR I-0000 
Case C-481/01, IMS Health v EC Commission, 11 April 2002, [2001] ECR I-5039; 
CFI, 
Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Association v Commission (British Aggregates 
Association II [2008] ECR II- 2789 
Case C-52/07 Kanal 5 and TV 4 v STIM [2008] ECR I-9275 
Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera [2011] ECR I-527 
  -43- 
Case C-53/03, Synetairismos Farmakopeion Aitolias & Akarnanias v. Glaxosmithkline 
AEVE, European Court Reports [2005] ECR I-4609 
Case C-7/97 Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791 
Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Commission [2007] ECR I-2331 
Case T- 201/04 Microsoft v. EC Commission [2007] ECR II- 3601 
Case T- 219/99 British Airways plc v Commission [2003] ECR II- 5917, [2004] 4 
CMLR 1008. 
Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 
Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission (‘Michelin II’) [2003] ECR II-4071 
Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2969 
Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477 
Case T-289/01, Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System Deutschland GmbH v. 
Commission[2007] ECR II-1691 
Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1990] ECR II-163 
Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, (1990) ECR II-309. 
Case T-513/93 Consiglio nazionale degli spedizionieri doganali v. Commission ECR 
II-1810, para 61 
Case T‐65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1993] ECR II-389  
Case T-65/98(Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission) [1998] ECR II-2641. 
Case T-66/01 ICI v. Commission [2010] ECR II-2631 
Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v. Commission ('Tetra Pak II') [1994] ECR II-755 
Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line and Others v 
Commission (‘TACA’) [2003] ECR II-3275 
Commission decision 94/119/EC, Port of Rødby, OJ [1994] L 55/52. 
COMP/39,525, Telekomunikacjia Polska 22 June 2011, on appeal Case T-486/11, 
ruling 17 December 2015, judgement pending 
Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v. Commission [1980] 
ECR 3125 
Joined Cases 240/82 to 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 268/82 and 269/82 Stichting 
Sigarettenindustrie and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 3831 
Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR 223 
  -44- 
Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann & Independent 
Television Publication Limited v EC Commission (“Magill”), 6 April 1995, [1995]ECR 
I-743 
Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission and France v. Ladbroke Racing 
[1997] ECR I-6265 
Joined Cases: T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line and Others v. 
Commission [2003] ECR II-3275 
 
Legislative Texts 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (2003) OJ L1/1 
Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 24.2.2009 
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (2004) OJ C31/
   
  -45- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
